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and finally a series of individual letters. Of these the most interesting are certain from Nelson, chiefly at the time of his service under Sir Hyde Parker before Copenhagen. Writing to a Jamaican friend in 1805, and speaking of the British possessions in the West Indies, he says (p. 439): "Neither in the field or in the senate shall their interest be infringed whilst I have an arm to fight in their defence, or a tongue to launch my voice against the damnable and cursed doctrine of Wilberforce and his hypocritical allies; and I hope my 'berth in heaven will be as exalted as his, who would certainly cause the murder of all our friends and fellow-subjects in the colonies."

American readers will be interested in the letter of Andrew Paton, pilot, of Pittenweem, who was enticed on board of Paul Jones's ship off the Isle of May, and remained there two months, including the time of the action between the *Bonhomme Richard* and the *Serapis*; also in a letter from a certain Lieutenant William Jacobs, who was at Boston in 1754, and served with the provincials in Acadia. He says (p. 403): "There is one thing in this part of the world, and that is the unkind behaviour of the regulars to the irregulars. Most of the officers are men of fortune in New England, and have left their estates to serve their king and country. The resentment has run so high that I believe the New England troops will not serve nor join the regulars any more; and perhaps will not serve at all, which will be a great loss to the Government; for the Americans are a brave, honest people. I do not pretend to say whose fault it is; but this is certain, it ought to be looked into, as these troops are all volunteers no longer than for a year."

J. FRANKLIN JAMESON.

The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson. Edited by M. OPPENHEIM.

Volumes I. and II. (London: Navy Records Society of Great Britain. 1902. Pp. lxvi, 395; 395.)

SIR WILLIAM MONSON, the first English seaman to write upon naval affairs, was regarded as the most distinguished naval expert of his time, and that time was the most stirring and momentous in the naval annals of England. These *Tracts* are a brief historical survey of the naval operations undertaken between 1585 and 1603, with a mature criticism of their plan and conduct. The author had known and served with all the famous English sailors of that day, and he wrote for the express purpose of giving light and guidance to those who were to come after him. These papers, therefore, can hardly fail to interest the general reader and are of deep interest to the naval student. These two volumes contain the first of the six books of these celebrated *Tracts*.

In 1585, when seventeen years old, young Monson ran away to sea, which was a usual mode of enlisting in that adventurous time. Helped no doubt by family influence, he gained rapid advancement and was a vice-admiral in 1602. That he was a trusted counselor and a bold and wary fighter is sufficiently attested by the following incidents. In the attack upon Cadiz in 1596 Monson successfully urged upon Essex

immediate entry into the harbor and headlong attack upon the shipping before attempting a landing. Again, in 1597, by his advice, which was expressly sought and given in writing, Essex was dissuaded from making the contemplated attack upon the shipping and harbor of Ferrol. Still further illustration is given by his midnight adventure at sea near the Azores, when he put off from his ship in a small boat to speak a Spanish fleet of twenty-five sail, in the hope of luring them on to chase and capture. Of this amusing adventure let him tell: "He commanded his master, on his allegiance, to keep the weather-gage of the fleet, whatsoever should become of him; and it blowing little wind he betook himself to his boat and rowed up with this fleet, demanding whence they were. They answered, of Seville in Spain, and asked of whence he was. He told them, of England; and that the ship in sight was a galleon of the Queen of England's, single and alone, alleging the honor they would get by winning her, urging them with daring speeches to chase her. This he did in policy, hoping to entice and draw them into the wake of our fleet if they should follow him, where they would be so entangled as they could not escape. They returned him some shot and ill language, but craftily kept on and would not alter their course to Terceira."

Like the story of Salamis to the Greeks is the story of the invincible armada to men of the English race. *Flavit Deus et dissipati sunt*, the cry of mingled triumph and thanksgiving, has long been taken as explanation, in part at least, of the great armada's failure. The true account of that ambitious undertaking is an epitome of the art of naval warfare, and Sir William Monson's opinions will receive ample illustration and adequate test by applying them to the conduct of that invasion and its repulse. He held that if the Spanish fleet had strictly obeyed its instructions to hug the coast of France in proceeding northward, it would have evaded the English, effected the desired junction with the Duke of Parma, and could then easily have succeeded in invading England. He says that but for the information given by a chance scout the English fleet would have been surprised and perhaps destroyed in Plymouth harbor; and surprise confers an overwhelming military advantage, which must be sought by maintaining the utmost secrecy, as it must be guarded against by exercising the greatest vigilance and by acquiring information by all possible means, as from scouts, spies, and otherwise. The possession of a secure harbor for an advanced base he holds to be an absolute necessity to successful invasion: no open roadstead is suitable, because subject to attack by special vessels, such as fire-ships (as befell the Spaniards at Calais). He thought that the proper place to fight the Spaniards was on their own coast; in other words, that the true defense must be offensive. In his opinion, the superior speed and skilful handling of the English ships conferred the greatest tactical advantage that could be desired on the sea. Ship endurance, the ability to keep the sea for a long period with the supplies carried, was recognized as of the utmost importance: this was shown by the inability of the English to continue on the Spanish coast just before the armada sailed, or to follow up the Spaniards after the vic-

tory off Gravelines, owing to the urgent necessity of revictualing and of replenishing the supplies of ammunition. He states that it is idle to hope for any decisive advantage in naval engagements without a decided superiority of ships: this is much the same as Nelson's "numbers only can annihilate." His experience convinced him that ships might properly dare to run past forts, if only the run were made at speed. He explains how a reasonably effective system may be devised for scouting, intercepting, gaining and keeping touch on the high seas, and steadily insists upon its great importance. Finally, he recognizes that wisdom, experience, and seamanlike skill may all come to naught through the chances and hazards of the sea.

Excepting only his belief in the possibility of successful invasion without first destroying or neutralizing the opposing fleet, all the above quoted opinions of Sir William Monson are accepted as true to-day, and they have been abundantly confirmed by the practice of great English seamen during the past three hundred years.

James the Sixth and the Gowrie Mystery. By ANDREW LANG. (London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1902. Pp. xiv, 280.)

THOSE who are not interested in the minute study of the problems of individual character, or who do not care to master details which, however intricate, "throw strange new light on Scottish manners and morals," will probably content themselves with the more summary and less picturesque treatment accorded the theme in the second volume of the author's *History of Scotland*, to whose thorough preparation the Gowrie monograph bears witness.

The present work would not have been written had Mr. Lang not obtained many unpublished and hitherto unknown manuscript materials. By their use he becomes the first to solve conclusively certain parts of the enigma, while in other directions his critical power appears to lead him further toward ultimate truth than any of his predecessors have gone. Much remains mysterious and conjectural, but the balance of fact and probability inclines decisively toward the innocence of James and the guilt of the Ruthvens.

Of the existence of a Gowrie plot Mr. Lang leaves little or no doubt; its precise aim must remain a matter of conjecture. He himself believes that the affair was the "desperate adventure of two very young men," who conspired to lure the king from Falkland to Perth by the tale of the pot of gold, there to kidnap him, convey him to Gowrie's castle of Dirleton near North Berwick, thence to impregnable Fast-castle, the stronghold of Logan of Restalrig, and "see how the country would take it." Kidnapping the king had become almost a family habit with the Ruthvens; it would gratify ambition and revenge, and was generally regarded, perhaps, as a harmless constitutional procedure not deserving of death. If there was no attempt to kidnap, Mr. Lang thinks there was no plot.